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Sociology and h i s t o r y ?  When someone u t t e r s  those  magic words, a 
s t rong f e e l i n g  w e l l s  up i n  m e .  The f e e l i n g  i s  unquenchable apathy, 
unu t t e rab le  ennui. (The ennui, I f e a r ,  extends t o  t h e  dozen o r  s o  essays  
on the  s u b j e c t  I have myself committed over t h e  years .  The apathy might 
even s t e m  from those  essays.)  The t o p i c  c a l l s  f o r t h  t h e  worst i n  both  
s o c i o l o g i s t s  and h i s t o r i a n s .  It c a l l s  f o r t h  d rea ry  d i s q u i s i t i o n s  on t h e  
L ,  . . epistemology of ~ e i s t e s w i s s e n s c h a f ~ & ~ ,  f l a t u l e n t  t r a c t s  on t h e  e v i l s  of 
. ,  P h i l i s t i n i s m ,  exhor ta t ions  t o  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  e f f o r t s ,  ea rnes t  essays  
' .asking whether h i s t o r y * i s ,  o r  ought t o  be,  q u a n t i f i a b l e .  Have we no 
..I . ~ 
choices b u t  t o  c h a t t e r ,  grumble, mumble, o r  shout?  
.. , 
. . 
I .  - ... Y e s ,  we have o the r  choices.  W e  can look backward o r  forward, and . . 
.:, 
. \:. ?: 
speak s o f t l y  bu t  c l e a r l y  about what w e  see. Looking backward, w e  can 
examine previous e f f o r t s  t o  answer ques t ions  which l i e  i n  t h e  zone of 
overlap between sociology and h i s t o r y .  Looking forward, w e  can i d e n t i f y  
f r u i t f u l  a r e a s  f o r  col labora t ion.  Let us  t a l k  about a problem which re-  
q u i r e s  us  t o  look i n  both d i r e c t i o n s .  Let  us t a l k  about t h e  o r i g i n s  of 
the  European p r o l e t a r i a t .  
The t o p i c  i s  old .  It c e r t a i n l y  an teda tes  t h e  invent ion of sociology 
a s  a s e p a r a t e  d i s c i p l i n e .  L i s t e n  t o  what Adam Smith wrote i n  t h e  century 
before  sociology declared independence, and published i n  t h e  year t h a t  the  
American colonies  declared independence: "The demand f o r  those  who l i v e  by 
wages n a t u r a l l y  inc reases  wi th  t h e  i n c r e a s e  of n a t i o n a l  wealth,  and cannot 
poss ib ly  i n c r e a s e  without it" (Wealth - of Nations,  Book I,  chapter  8) .  
"Those who l i v e  by wages" is  t h e  s h o r t  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t .  
"The l i b e r a l  reward of l a b o r ,  the re fo re , "  s a i d  Smith l a t e r  on, "as i t  i s  
t h e  e f f e c t  of i n c r e a s i n g  wealth,  s o  i t  is  t h e  cause  of increasing'popu- 
l a t i o n .  To complain of i t  i s  t o  lament over t h e  necessary e f f e c t  and 
cause  of t h e  g r e a t e s t  p u b l i c  prosper i ty ."  I n  Smith 's  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  . 
i nc reas ing  d i v i s i o n  of l abor  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  r a t i o n a l  d i s p o s i t i o n  of t h e  
f a c t o r s  of production -- land,  l abor  and c a p i t a l  -- by those  who con t ro l l ed  
each of them. Since t h e  inc reas ing  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r  enhanced producti-  
v i t y ,  i t  increased t h e  r e t u r n  t o  a l l  f a c t o r s  of production,  inc luding 
l a b o r .  I n d i r e c t l y ,  t h e  r a t i o n a l  d i s p o s i t i o n  of resources  l ed  t o  t h e  growth 
of t h a t  p a r t  of t h e  popula t ion  which l i v e d  from wages alone.  It l e d  t o  t h e  
growth of t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t .  
How d id  t h a t  growth occur? So f a r  a s  I know, Adam Smith never 
analyzed t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  process  i n  d e t a i l .  Perhaps i t  seemed too  obvious: 
wage-laborers m u l t i p l i e d  because t h e  demand f o r  t h e i r  labor  increased.  
Malthus'  gloss on Smith, after 0, does l i t t l e  more than e labora te  t h a t  
b a s i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
Writ ing a century  l a t e r ,  however, Kar l  Marx considered t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
process  of p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n  t o  b e  both  fundamental and problematic. 
Chapters twenty-five t o  thir ty-two of Das K a p i t a l  d i scuss  a t  length  t h e  
formation of the  English p r o l e t a r i a t .  Marx denied emphatical ly t h a t  the  
smooth opera t ion  of demand accounted f o r  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  
Engl ish- labor  fo rce .  "The p r o l e t a r i a t  c r e a t e d  by t h e  breaking up of t h e  
bands of f euda l  r e t a i n e r s  and by t h e  f o r c i b l e  expropr ia t ion  of t h e  people 
from the  s o i l , "  he wrote ,  " t h i s  ' f r e e '  p r o l e t a r i a t  could not  poss ib ly  be 
absorbed by t h e  nascent  manufactures as f a s t  a s  i t  w a s  thrown upon t h e  
world" (chapter  28).  Thus, according t o  Marx, t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e se rve  army 
which was essential to the operation of capitalist labor markets began to 
form. It is worth noting that Marx concentrated on rural, and especially 
agricultural, workers; only since his time has the term "proletarian" taken 
on its current connotation of large-shop manufacturing. .. 
In general, Marx portrayed proletarianization as the forcible 
wresting of control over the means of production away from artisans and, 
especially, peasants. "In the history of primitive' accumulation," he de- 
clared at the end of chapter twenty-six, 
all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the 
. . capitalist class in course of formation; but, above all, those 
:>r 
. _. moments when great basses of men are suddenly and forcibly 
, I torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free 
*f . and "unattached" proletarians on the labour-market. The 
L - 
t expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, 
, . 
: 1: 
from the soil, is the basis of the whole process. 
'.. 
. + T h u s  the central fact was the creation of a rural proletariat, working 
mainly for wages in agriculture, but available at bargain rates for indus- 
trial production. 
Marx had little to say about the numbers involved, or about how 
those numbers changed from one period to the next. His implicit argument 
in that regard .had two elements. First, the important increases in the 
number of proletarians occurred in bursts of expropriation such as the 
enclosures. Second, once people were proletarians, they more or less 
reproduced themselves: proletarians begat proletarians,.apparently in con- 
stant numbers. If that is the case, the growth of the proletariat directly 
measures both the progress of expropriation and the current extent of 
exploitation. 
Here sociology and history come together. ~arx' analysis, and his 
apparent insouciance about the numbers involved, provide a prime oppor- 
tunity for complementary work by people from the two disciplines. There 
is the opportunity to verify the main lines of Marx' analysis -- for example, 
the idea of spurts of proletarianization as a consequence of massive expro- 
priation. There is the opportunity to specify the different paths by 
which people moved from artisanal or peasant production into various forms 
of wage labor. There is the opportunity to assign relative weights to 
those paths: which ones bore the most traffic? There is the opportunity to 
integrate them into a general account of the flows of people by which the 
'largely peasant and artisanal European population of 1500 or 1600 became 
.the overwhelmingly proletarian European population of 1900 and later. 
7 -  
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. \  , : - How and'why diid'that great shift occur? Why in Europe rather than 
> 4 
. . elsewhere? In the century since Marx, one version or another of that double 
question has dominated the agenda of modern European economic and social 
,history. Some of the debate has pivoted on the facts: how many yeomen, for 
example, did enclosures actually displace? Some of the debate has concerned 
the proper way to state the questions: Weber and Tawney differed over the 
appropriate Problemstellung as much as over the historical facts. And much 
of the debate has dealt with explanations: why did capitalism flourish 
earlier in Britain than in Prussia? 
These problems are essentially historical: they concern real people 
at specific times and places in the past. Why, then, might proud and self- 
sufficient historians want to share them with mere sociologists? Well, both 
a backward look and a forward look identify these problems as a fruitful 
zone of collaboration between historians and sociologists. The backward 
look shows that one group of specialists within sociology has already 
0 
given h i s t o r i a n s  va luab le  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  and assembling the  
c r u c i a l  evidence. Those s p e c i a l i s t s  a r e  t h e  demographers. Once h i s t o r i a n s  
saw the  value  of demographic approaches t o  t h e i r  problems t o  be su re ,  
they acquired many of t h e  e s s e n t i a l  s k i l l s  themselves. Nonetheless, t h e  
continuing con t r ibu t ions  of such,demographers as Louis Henry remained 
c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  study of European popula t ions .  Furthermore, t h e  
forward look r e v e a l s  a whole s e r i e s  of f u r t h e r  problems t o  which socio- 
l o g i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  i s  r e l e v a n t ,  perhaps even indispensable .  
One d u l l ,  r o u t i n e  soc io log ica l  procedure which promises t o  help t h e  
sea rch  f o r  t h e  o r i g i n s  of t h e  ~ u r ' o ~ e a n  p r o l e t a r i a t  i s  t o  break t h e  search 
i n t o  t h r e e  p a r t s .  The f i r s t  p a r t  i s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of components of growth. 
The second, t h e  explanation of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  components and t h e i r  i n t e r -  
I _ * ,  ' a c t i o n s .  The t h i r d ,  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of those  p a r t i a l  explanat ions  i n t o  a  
r .  <? - -  P " g e n e r a l  account of t h e  process. Let m e  s t r e s s  a t  once t h a t  these  a r e  
l o g i c a l  subdivis ions  of the  t a sk ,  not' d i s t i n c t  temporal s t ages .  I f  w e  
. .' 
,'don't begin wi th  a p iece  of the  t h i r d  p a r t ,  wi th  a  t e n t a t i v e  account of t h e  
e n t i r e  process of p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n ,  indeed,  w e  a r e  q u i t e  l i k e l y  t o  
wander through t h e  a n a l y s i s  of components of growth, and t o  stumble through 
t h e  explanation of ind iv idua l  components and t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n s .  The 
s e c r e t  i s  t o  begin wi th  a  t e n t a t i v e  account which is  c l e a r l y  v e r i f i a b l e ,  
f a l s i f i a b l e  and c o r r e c t i b l e .  . O r ,  b e t t e r  s t i l l ,  two o r  t h r e e  competing 
accounts which a r e  c l e a r l y  v e r i f i a b l e ,  f a l s i f i a b l e ,  and c o r r e c t i b l e .  
Accounts b u i l t  on t h e  arguments of Adam Smith and Karl  Marx, l e t  us say.  
Components of growth? A t  i t s  s imples t ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  c o n s i s t s  of 
def in ing p r e c i s e l y  t h e  change being analyzed,  preparing a  l o g i c a l l y  
exhaustive list of t h e  components of t h a t  change, and es t imat ing the  
con t r ibu t ion  of each component t o  t h e  change a s  a whole. I n  t h e  case  of 
European proletarianization, we must begin with working definitions of 
11 Europe" and "proletarian". That means deciding what to do with Iceland, 
Constantinople, Malta, the Azores, and so on. It also means deciding 
whether it is possible to be a little bit proletarian -- for example, 
whether the independent weaver who hires himself out for the harvest 
qualifies as a proletarian, as one quarter of a proletarian, or as no 
proletarian at all. What about his young children? Uninteresting deci- 
sions, these, except that they significantly affect the results of the 
analysis. 
These dull but crucial decisions made, we can begin to ask how the 
absolute number and the proportion of the European population in the 
. . category 'Iproletarian" changed from, say, 1500 to 1900. We'll come back 
_ . . _ .  - to guesses.at the real numbers later. For now, the thing to notice is 
) .  . that we can break down those numbers into geographic, temporal and, most 
important, logical components. We may ask where the transformation of 
. "non-proletarian populations into proletarian populations occurred. Did it 
happen mainly in areas of advanced capitalism? We may ask when the 
transformation occurred? Did the process accelerate greatly with the 
d 
expansion of large-scale manufacturing after 1800? We may also ask - how 
it happened. But the how, in this case, concerns the logical components 
of the change. 
If we turn to standard demographic accounting procedures, we find 
three logical possibilities. Each is in turn the resultant of two possible 
changes. The three logical possibilities are reclassification, natural 
increase and net migration. Marx stressed reclassification: the movement 
of a'particular social unit from one category to another as a consequence of 
an alteration in its own characteristics or relationships. If individuals 
are our social units, every person who in his own lifetime loses control 
over his or her means of production adds to the toll of proletarianization. 
Thus every landowning peasant who loses his land and becomes an agri- 
cultural wage-worker counts. However, every wage-worker who sets up 
business for himself subtracts himself from the toll of proletarianization. 
In fact, the same individual often oscillates between the two categories 
throughout his or her lifetime. The net effect of all such moves across 
the boundary is the component of reclassification. 
Natural increase is the resultant of births and deaths. If I 
read him aright, Marx' implicit assumption was that natural increase was 
. ,. 
. . .. . , an unimportant component of the growth of the European proletariat: the 
- I deaths more or less balanced out the births, while net enlargements of 
' .  
. : .z. L . .. .. . .: .- the proletariat.depended on new entries by.people who began life as non- 
f .  r . : proletarians. This is where the components-of-growth analysis gets inter- 
esting. For several alternative possibilitiesexist. Given their vulnera- 
bility-to infectious .disease,-stamtion and war, proletarians sometimes 
underwent a natural decrease: deaths exceeded births. The question is: 
how often and how much? If natural decrease were the normal situation of 
proletarians, the proletarian population would be in something like the 
situation of most pre-industrial cities: they would have to recruit sub- 
stantial numbers of newcomers merely to maintain their current size. To 
grow, they would have to recruit very large numbers indeed. 
It is also possible that the normal situation of proletarians was 
for their birth rates to run above their death rates. In that case, the 
proletarian population could grow without any new recruitment of non- 
proletarians. If the proletarian rate of natural increase were higher than 
that of the population as a whole, the proletarian share of the total popu- 
lation would tend to rise, even in the absence of lifetime mobility from 
non-proletarian to proletarian. With additional permutations of fertility 
and mortality, still further alternatives are quite possible; for example, 
the proletarian rate of natural increase could have risen over time. 
The third component -- net migration -- likewise offers multiple 
possibilities. If we are considering the European population as a whole, 
the migration that matters consists of moves of proletarians into and out 
of the continent. Because that component, too, sums up numerous losses 
and gains, its overall effect may have been nil, a substantial addition to 
the proletariat, a substantial subtraction from the proletariat, a change 
over time, or something else. If we start considering migration into and 
out of the proletarian populations of different European regions, the 
problem becomes more complex and interesting. 
To recapitulate: as in any population change, we can break down the 
increase of the European proletarian population from 1500 to 1900 (or for 
a ,  any other interval) in terms of a standard accounting equation: 
P2 = P1 + (IC - OC) + (B - D) + (IM - OM) + e 
where P and P2 are the populations at the two points in time, IC and OC 1 
are the numbers of persons who make lifetime moves into the category and 
out of it, B and D are births and deaths of members of the category, IM and 
OM are in-migration and out-migration, and e is the measurement error 
summed over all these observations. 
Now, why should anyone care about these hypothetical numbers? For 
more reasons than one. First, if we are to attempt any general account of 
Europe's proletarianization, we have no choice but to formulate hypotheses 
about the components of growth. The hypotheses may be implicit, and 
they may be very crude; they may consist, for example, of assigning an 
indefinitely large positive value to the net effect of lifetime moves and 
zero values to all the other components. That is the tone of Marx' 
analysis. Adam Smith, on the other hand, wrote as if natural increase were 
the only component differing significantly from zero. Thus in the absence 
of any exact numbers, the simple knowledge of which domponents were posi- 
tive or negative, large or small, would give us the means of judging 
whether Marx' formulation, Smith's formulation, or some modification of one 
or the other, was more adequate. 
Second, the relative weight and direction of the three components 
make a genuine difference to our understanding of the historical experience 
of'proletarianization. To the extent that lifetime moves into.the prole- 
tariat comprised the dominant process, we might expect a good deal of 
proletarian action to consist of efforts to retain or regain individual 
control over the means of production. On the other hand, chat same exten- 
sive recruitment through lifetime moves would make it more difficult to 
account for the existence of an autonomous proletarian culture, persikting 
from one generation to-the next. To the extent that natural increase was 
the main source of growth in the proletariat, we would find it easy to 
understand autonomous, persistent proletarian culture, but hard to account 
for artisanal and peasant themes in' that culture. To the extent that net 
migration was the primary source, we might expect the proletariat to be 
the locus not only of alienation but of aliens, and to be correspondingly 
resistant to unification. The contrasting portraits of proletarian experi- 
ence which come to us from, say, E. P. Thompson and Louis Chevalier may 
result in part from their having studied populations which differed signifi- 
cantly in these regards, or from their having implicitly assumed differing 
configurations of reclassification, natural increase and net migration. 
Third, the composition of the three major components matters as 
well. Zero net migration over a long period may result from no moves in 
either direction, from large but exactly equal flows of definitive in- 
migrants and definitive out-migrants, from numerous circular migrants who 
spend some time at the destination and then return to their-points of 
origin, and from a number of other equalizing migration patterns. These 
are very different social.situations. They have very different impli- 
cations for social control, proletarian culture, class conflict and the 
recruitment of an industrial labor force. 
Positive or negative net migration may likewise result from a wide 
variety of migratory patterns, each affecting life at the destination in 
different ways. The same observation holds for the sub-components of 
reclassification: temporary or definitive moves into the proletariat, 
.temporary or definitive moves out of the proletariat. Clearly it holds.for 
births and deaths as well. Consider the difference between a) slight 
natural increase due to high fertility which is almost balanced by high 
mortality and b) slight natural increase due to low fertility which is 
matched with even lower mortality. That is the difference between the death- 
ridden experience of the sixteenth century and the long life of the twentieth. 
To make such distinctions, we do not need the precise numbers. But we do 
need to consider the full set of components of growth. 
It is a good thing we don't need the precise numbers. If we did, 
the task would be impossible in our lifetimes. Although the methods of 
archeology, paleobotany and historical demography may one day converge on 
fine estimating procedures for the European population, at present we have 
only a  crude sense  of t h e  grand t o t a l s .  What i s  more, w e  have no large- 
s c a l e  estimates of t h e  p r o l e t a r i a n  populat ion.  Indeed, w e  f a c e  one of 
those r e c u r r e n t  h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l  i r o n i e s :  t h e  ideas  of "labor force" and 
I1 employment" a r e  a t  once e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  keeping of t h e  s o r t s  of s t a t i s -  
t i c s  we need and cont ingent  on t h e  very process  w e  hope t o  t r a c e :  prole- 
t a r i a n i z a t i o n .  I n  genera l ,  we cannot look t o  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  r e p o r t s  of 
n a t i o n a l  s t a t e s  be fore  t h e . f u l 1  bloom of nineteenth-century p r o l e t a r i a n i -  
za t ion .  For earlier per iods ,  w e  must combine a n a l y s i s  of t r ends  i n  small 
a reas  which h i s t o r i a n s  have s tudied i n t e n s i v e l y  wi th  i n d i r e c t  inferences  
from o t h e r ,  more genera l  t rends.  
We might, f o r  example, r e f l e c t  on t r ends  i n  t o t a l  and urban popula- 
I 
t i o n  s i n c e  1500. Table 1 and Figure 1 assemble d a t a  from many d i s p a r a t e  
sources -- espec ia l ly . f rom Chandler and Fox.' mammoth compilation of 
urban populat ions.  The numbers run higher  than t h e  usua l  e s t ima tes  ( fo r  
example, those  i n  D e V r i e s  1976) because they include European Russia,  
" U r o p e a n  Turkey and therest of e a s t e r n  and Mediterranean Europe. I f  the  
numbers have any r e l a t i o n  t o  r e a l i t y ,  they a r e  begui l ing .  They i n d i c a t e  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  constant  rate of European popula t ion growth be fore  1750: a  b i t  
f a s t e r  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s i x t e e n t h  century,  a  b i t  slower i n  t h e  e a r l y  seven- 
t een th ,  bu t  genera l ly  f l u c t u a t i n g  around a q u a r t e r  of one percent  per  year .  - 
Afte r  1750, and e s p e c i a l l y  from 1850 t o  1900, w e  wi tness  an  a c c e l e r a t i o n  of 
t o t a l  growth d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  n e t  emigrat ion from Europe was l ikewise 
a c c e l e r a t i n g .  I n  these  f i g u r e s ,  t h e  "expansion" of t h e  s i x t e e n t h  century 
and t h e  " c r i s i s "  of t h e  seventeenth appear a s  minor dev ia t ions  from a  well- 
e s t a b l i s h e d  t rend r a t h e r  than a s  major turnabouts.  However, s i n c e  the  
es t ima tes  be fore  1800 r e s u l t  from i n t e r p o l a t i o n s  and ap,proximations, we 
should t r e a t  t h e i r  ups and downs a s  f r a g i l e  hypotheses. 
The f i g u r e s  - f o r  urban populat ion a r e  a  b i t  more s o l i d .  They 
r e s u l t  from t h e  c o l l a t i o n  of repor ted  f i g u r e s  f o r  ind iv idua l  p laces  
throughout t h e  450-year i n t e r v a l ,  i n t e r p o l a t e d  and summed a t  t h e  f i f t y -  
year  marks. They i n d i c a t e  more o r  less continuous 'urban growth through- 
ou t  t h e  per iod,  a s  w e  might expect .  They show t h e  expected speeding up 
of urban growth a f t e r  1800. Y e t  they a l s o  have an unexpected impli- 
ca t ion .  I f  t h e  f i g u r e s  a r e  c o r r e c t ,  t h e  sha re  of t h e  European population 
i n  b i g  c i t i e s  r o s e  dramat ica l ly  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s i x t e e n t h  century.  From 1500 
t o  1550, t h e  propor t ion of t h e  popula t ion i n  c i t ies  of 100,000 o r  more 
went from 1 .6  t o  2.9 percent .  A major p a r t  of t h a t  s ixteenth-century 
growth occurred i n  Mediterranean c i t i e s ,  inc luding Constantinople. Never- 
t h e l e s s ,  f u t u r e  North European l e a d e r s  such a s  London, Copenhagen, Danzig 
and Amsterdam were growing'as w e l l .  The f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a f t e r  the  
f i r s t  surge  of s ixteenth-century urban growth, t h e  propor t ion of t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n  i n  l a r g e  c i t i e s  d i d  no t  r i s e  again  u n t i l  t h e  n ineteenth  century.  
I n  f a c t ,  i f  we sum t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  c i t i e s  of 20,000 and l a r g e r ,  they show 
a  de-urbanization of Europe a f t e r ' 1 6 0 0 .  
Now, t h a t  s u r p r i s i n g  conclusion may w e l l  fade  away i n  t h e  l i g h t  of 
f u l l e r  evidence. Nonetheless, i t  i s  n o t  s o  implausible on t h e  second look 
a s  i t  is  on t h e  f i r s t .  I f  t h e  f i g u r e s  a r e  c o r r e c t ,  Europe de-urbanized 
from 1600 t o  1800 because urban growth slowed while t o t a l  growth continueG. 
To put i t  another  way, t h e  r u r a l  and small-town populat ion grew f a s t e r  ths:. 
t h e  populat ion i n  l a r g e  c i t i e s .  It i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  normal n a t u r a l  
decrease of c i t i e s  grew l a r g e r  a s  s a n i t a t i o n ,  n u t r i t i o n  and h e a l t h  c a r e  
decl ined,  t h a t  t h e  normal n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  of r u r a l  a r e a s  increased a s  
f e r t i l i t y  r o s e  o r  mor ta l i ty  dec l ined ,  and t h a t  t h e  normal rural-to-urban 
flow of migrants  diminished. A l l  t h r e e  may w e l l  have happened. 
Table 1. Total and Urban Population of Europe, 1500-1950. 
Percent of Total in Cities of: 
Total 50,000 20,000 
Population to to 
Year In Thousands 100, O O W  99,999 49,999 
Figure 1. Europe 1500-1950: Numbers of People by Size of Settlement. 
These hypothetical changes are thinkable for several reasons. 
First, Europe's larger cities were unhealthy places, and may well have 
gotten unhealthier as they grew. Second, the food supply of large cities 
was growing increasingly problematic in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries despite modest increases in agricultural productivity. Urban 
growth may well have overrun the general capacity of European agriculture 
to support non-producers, surpassed the abilities of merchants and officials 
to extract whatever.surplus did exist, strained the limits to shipping of 
food set by reliance on navigable waterways, and exceeded the possibility 
that particular cities and their immediate hinterlands could produce enough 
S t  to sustain their own non-agricultural populations. In such circumstances 
we would expect the cost of food to rise prohibitively in urban areas. 
. . .  . - .. . The eighteenth-century rise of the food.riot..and the elaboration of muni- 
:Z1 . 
,-I ' . ' _ _  cipal and national controls over food supply certainly suggest a sharpening 
... _ 
.' . struggle over the disposition of food during the period of apparent de- 
urbanization. Third, as we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that 
'natural increase rose in important parts of rural and small-town Europe 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whether such increases. 
resulted from declining mortality, rising fertility, or both, remains 
debatable. We shall return to that problem, too. 
The final possible source of de-urbanization connects the most 
directly with our inquiry into the origins of the proletariat. Two kinds 
of employment were growing rapidly in the Europe of 1600 to 1800; they were 
surely growing more rapidly in small towns and rural areas than in.big 
cities. One was wage-labor in agriculture. The other was cottage industry 
The expansion of agricultural wage-labor proletarianized, almost by defi- 
nition; it was the principal case Marx had in mind. The growth of cottage 
industry did not necessarily proletarianize; tha,t depended on who held 
control of the means of production. But in fact the major European forms 
of cottage industry-created a workforce which depended for survival on the 
- 
sale of its labor power. Thus it is plausible (although far-from estab- 
lished) that a temporary de-urbanization of Europe did-occur in the seven- 
teenth and eighteenth centuries, and that the growth of a rural proletariat 
contributed significantly to that de-urbanization. 
If we start our inquiry at 1500 and end it at 1900, we are dealing 
wi.th an increase in the total European population from fifty or sixty mil- 
lion to around 500 million. That makes a net rise of about 450 million. 
A large portion of that increase consisted of net additions to the prole- 
where 
tariat. But how much, whenland how? Of the estimated 56 million Europeans 
in 1500, a good half were probably peasants -- people 1iving.mainly from 
. ' .  agriculture who supplied the bulk of their own labor requirements and 
exercised substantial control over the land they farmed. It is unlikely 
that many more than a million were landlords, officials, merchants or 
, '  
artisans who disposed of the products of their labor. That leaves a possible 
twenty million wage-workers in agriculture, manufacturing and services. 
By 1900, the great majority of the 500 million Europeans were wage- 
workers and their households. Now, setting limits on all these speculative 
numbers is itself an important task for theory and research. Since at this 
point we are only seeking orders of magnitude, however, let us simply 
guess the number of proletarians in 1900 at a conservative 300 million. 
That figure would leave us a net increase of 280 million proletarians to 
account for. ' (It would also, incidentally, give us a net increase of some- 
thing like 160 million - non-proletarians to explain.) If those are the 
rhere numbers, we must ask when and how the increase occurred. 
The timing of total population growth sets important limits on the 
possible timetable of proletarianization. Since the population of Europe 
rose from under 200 million to around 500 million during the nineteenth 
- century, a large part of the net increase in the proletariat must also 
have occured in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless,. given the signifi- 
cant eighteenth-century expansion of wage labor in such widely scattered 
areas as England, Poland and Spain, it is quite possible that by 1800 some- 
thing like 100 million Europeans were already proletarians and their 
households. Now, according to my estimates no more than twelve million 
people then lived in cities of 20,000 or larger. Nine-tenths if Europe's 
proletarians therefore probably lived in smaller cities, towns and rural 
'areas. In tracing the proletarianization of Europe before 1800, we have 
'.to give priority to farms and villages. From the nineteenth century on- 
ward, larger cities start occupying our attention. 
We are thinking about components of growth within a population 
which broke down something like this: 
. i 
(millions of persons) 
1500 1800 1900 
total population 55 190 500 
non-proletarians: peasants, 
artisans, landlords, officials, etc. 30 100 200 
proletarians in cities of 20,000+ 3 10 100 
proletarians in smaller places 2 2 8 0 200 
To avoid any misunderstanding, let me repeat: these numbers are no more 
than thoughtful guesses, orders of magnitude, hypotheses to verify. Their 
revision stands high on the agenda of historical demography. I have de- 
liberately understated my own sense of the size of the proletariat in 
1900, in order td avoid fruitless controversies about so-called peasants 
who owned an acre of land, or so-called artisans who had nothing but a 
toolbox to call their own. Even understated, the numbers suggest a . . 
thirty-fold increase in the proletarian population in larger cities, a 
ten-fold increase of proletarians in smaller places, a more rapid increase 
of proletarians in smaller places before 1800, a great acceleration of 
urban proletarianization in the nineteenth century. With these orders of 
magnitude in mind, let us return to the components of growth: reclassi- 
fication, natural increase and net migration. . 
Reclassification 
Speaking of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Netherlands, Jan 
De Vries distinguishes between two models of rural social organization: a 
peasant model and a specialization model. Peasants produce enough to 
. . survive at a conventional level of well-being and to meet their basic 
outside obligations. They work to insulate themselves from the market's 
' I  
vagaries.. They produce a variety of non-agricultural goods and services, 
while avoiding purchases of goods and services as much as possible. They 
seek in general to maintain all their offspring on the land. With natural 
increase that strategy produces subdivision of holdings and intensified 
cultivation of the available land. The result is then that per captia in- 
come almost never rises, but remains constant or declines. 
Specialists, on the other hand, exploit the market by concentrating 
on profitable crops. They specialize in agricultural production, and pur- 
chase goods and services they cannot produce profitably. They accumulate 
capital and reinvest it in land and equipment. Such children as they can- 
not profitably employ on the land they place in other forms of enterprise. 
Over the long run, their p.er capita income tends to rise. The specialists 
are capitalists, the peasants non-capitalists, often anti-capitalists. 
The two models identify two quite different exits from the peasantry. 
The peasant path leads eventually to wage-labor in agriculture or in in- 
dustry. The specialization path leads to cash-crop farming. The peasant 
strategy proletarianizes, while the specialization strategy, if successful, 
capitalizes. The peasant strategy leads to wage labor for two reasons: 
first, because its internal logic results sooner or later in the.over- 
running of the household's capacity to support itself from the land it 
controls; second, because in the meantime capitalists are expanding their 
cmtrol over the land and over other means of production. English enclo- 
b 
sures and Polish "refeudalization" are variants on that second pattern. 
.Whether the new proletarians remained in agricultural wage labor, moved 
li.' .,, ... . . .. into manufacturing or took up some combination of the two varied.signifi- 
cantly as a function of the-local labor requirements of agriculture and the 
market for local manufactures. In the Swiss mountain areas studies by 
Rudolf Braun, cottage textile manufacturing oriented toward Zurich dis- 
placed the subsistence agriculture of the uplands. In the Leicestershire 
agricultural villages studies by David Levine, cottage industry provided 
the context for proletarianization where the landlord tolerated it, but 
dairy farming produced a later, slower and more subtle form of proletarian- 
ization where the landlord would not tolerate manufacturing. In the Flan- 
ders studied by Franklin Mendels, the proletarianizing populations of the 
coast moved into agricultural wage labor, while those of the interior 
moved into a mixture of agriculture and textile industry, and shifted their 
weight from one to the other as a function of the available wage. 
Parallel paths led away from theworld of artisans, Artisans skidded 
into the proletariat as cheaper. production processes reduced the demand 
for their wares and as entrepreneurs assumed control over the means of 
production. But a few artisans climbed into the bourgeoisie by becoming 
successful entrepreneurs. Herbert Kisch gives us the contrast between 
Silesia and the Rhineland (Kisch 1959, 1965, 19'68). In both places the 
growth of rural textile production undercut the urban craft guilds. But 
in Silesia the process was one of almost pure proletarianization, as a 
small number of chartered merchants worked with large landlords who were 
happy to have weaver-serfs contributing to the incomes of their estates. 
In the Rhineland proletarianization was likewise the main trend, but a ' 
..few master craftsman in Cologne, Barmen, Aachen and elsewhere accumulated 
capital and made themselves pivotal figures in textile production. Although 
Kisch does not give us the details of labor force recruitment, lifetime 
movement from artisan to proletarian must have been a common experience 
.*in both regions. In neither case, however, is it likely that reclassifica- 
tion was the main component of the proletariat's growth. Natural increase 
and migtatianmrPst have been important in both Silesia and the Rhineland. 
Natural Increase 
Natural increase or decrease is the net effect of births and deaths. 
The proletariat grows through natural increase when, in any given period, 
more proletarians are born than die. Perhaps we should distcnguish between 
the proletarian children of non-proletarian parents and the proletarian 
children of proletarians. In the first case we are midway between reclas- 
sification and natural increase: if at a given succession a peasant holding 
fragments into pieces too small to support the heirs, we may debate how 
much of chat family's move into the proletariat is due to natural increase. 
The same is true of the "extra" child of a peasant family who.spends life 
a s  a se rvan t  o r  day-laborer.  Yet a t  l e a s t  some of t h e  r e su l t i , ng  expansion 
of t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  n a t u r a l  inc rease .  . 
The l e a s t  ambiguous, and most impor tant ,  c a s e  i s  somehow t h e  most 
ignored. It is t h e  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  of fu l l - f l edged  p r o l e t a r i a n s .  I f ,  on 
t h e  average,  t h e  n a t u r a l  inc rease  of wage l a b o r e r s  were g r e a t e r  than t h a t  
of peasants  and a r t i s a n s ,  t h a t  f a c t  a lone  would b e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  produce a 
r e l a t i v e  growth of t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  wi thout  any skidding of peasants  o r  
a r t i s a n s  and without  any in-migration of p r o l e t a r i a n s .  I suspect  t h a t  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  n a t u r a l  inc rease  was t h e  p r i n c i p a l  component i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
growth of t h e E u r o p e a n p r o l e t a r i a t  from 1500 t o  1900. More p r e c i s e l y ,  I 
suspect  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  component w a s  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  r e s u l t i n g  from 
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between f a i r l y  high m o r t a l i t y  and ve ry  h igh f e r t i l i t y .  More 
p r e c i s e l y  y e t ,  I propose t h e  fo l lowing hypothes is :  on the  average, p r o l e t a r -  
. . . , . iansi?responded t o  economic expansion wi th  g r e a t e r  d e c l i n e s  i n  mor ta l i ty  and 
g r e a t e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  f e r t i l i t y  than t h e  non-prole tar ian  popula t ion ,  and 
responded t o  economic con t rac t ion  wi th  g r e a t e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  mor ta l i ty  but  
ho greater d e c l i n e s  i n  f e r t i l i t y  than t h e  non-prole tar ian;  t h e  consequence 
was a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  of p r o l e t a r i a n s  i n  good times which 
was uncompensated by t h e  n a t u r a l  dec rease  of bad t imes.  Since the  period 
w e  a r e  cons ider ing  was on t h e  whole a t i m e  of economic expansion, such a 
system would have produced a s i g n i f i c a n t  tendency f o r  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  t o  
inc rease  more r a p i d l y  than t h e  rest of t h e  populati'on. My hypothesis  i s  
t h a t  i t  d id .  
I n  one muted form o r  ano the r ,  t h e  hypothes is  i s  q u i t e  o ld .  I n  h i s  
p ioneer ing  s tudy  of t h e  Vale of Tren t ,  J . D .  Chambers noted the  higher 
n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  of pa r i shes  wi th  r u r a l  i n d u s t r y  dur ing  t h e  years  from 1670 
t o  1800. Although they l ack  c r u c i a l  evidence concerning t h e  components of 
growth, Karlheinz Blaschke's analysis of Saxony, Arnost ~lzma's discussion 
of Bohemia and Rudolf Braun's portrayal of the Zurich Uplands all bring out 
a similar contrast between slow-growing regions of agriculture and fast- 
growing regions of rural industry. In his fairly direct attack on the prob- 
lem, David Levine identifies a relationship between rising natural increase 
and rural industrial growth in eighteenth-century Shepshead, between rising 
natural increase and agricultural proletarianization in nineteenth-century 
Bottesford. 
If such a relationship holds, it reverses some of our conventional 
wisdom. We commonly think of rural proletarianization as a consequence of 
rapid population growth -- too many people for the available land. But 
the possibility we see here is that proletarianization may induce rapid 
population growth. Of course, both may be true. Then a process of 
proletarianization initiated by some such action as enclosure will tend 
to perpetuate itself up -- or, rather, down -- to the limit set by starva- 
tion. 
How and why would the natural increase of proletarians tend to exceed 
that of non-proletarians? The critical relationships link fertility, mar- 
riage and the availability of employment. In a world in which most house- 
holds control their own means of production, the chief opportunities for 
young adults are to inherit positions within their own households, or to 
enter other households. In the world of European artisans and peasants, 
the capital of a household set stringent limits on the number of persons 
it could sustain; household capital thereby limited the number of children 
who could remain home into adulthood, and especially into marriage and 
parenthood. The only way to enter another household was.a full-fledged 
adult was to marry in. Persons who entered as servants, apprentices, day- 
l abore r s  and t h e  l i k e  o r d i n a r i l y  acquired no c o n t r o l  over t h e  household 
means of production,  and no r i g h t  t o  marry o r  t o  procrea te .  Oppor tuni t ies  
t o  marry, t o  have c h i l d r e n ,  and t o  p lace  one 's  own ch i ld ren  i n  fu l l - f ledged 
a d u l t  p o s i t i o n s  thus  depended on t h e  r a t e  a t  which s e n i o r  p o s i t i o n s  i n  
households were opening up. Mor ta l i ty  was t h e  chief  determinant  of t h a t  
rate. But on occas ion out-migration o r  t h e  p u t t i n g  of new land i n t o  cul- 
t i v a t i o n  a l s o  provided new a d u 1 t . o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
Under t h e s e  circumstances,  couples adapted both  t h e i r  marriage r a t e  
and t h e i r  f e r t i l i t y  t o  t h e  probable a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a d u l t  p o s i t i o n s  and t o  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e i r  newborn c h i l d r e n  would survive  t o  adulthood. 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  marriage and f e r t i l i t y  surged a f t e r  famine o r  p e s t i l e n c e  wiped 
out  many a d u l t s ,  and slowed when m o r t a l i t y  decl ined.  O r  s o  i t  seems. Any 
8 .  
L..- hypothesis  which . impl ies  widespread, d e l i b e r a t e  f e r t i l i t y  c o n t r o l  before  
, > 
t h e  n ineteenth  century  i s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i n  t h e  p resen t  s t a t e . o f  our  knowledge. 
< .  :' , .: Furthermore, t h e  main r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  hard t o  d i sen tang le  empi r i ca l ly  
. . from o the  con t ra ry  e f f e c t s .  It i s  l i k e l y ,  f o r  example, t h a t  improvements 
i n  n u t r i t i o n  boosted f e r t i l i t y  and depressed m o r t a l i t y  s imultaneously 
(McKeown 1976, Lee 1977b). It i s  q u i t e  poss ib le ,  a s  W i l l i a m  Langer has sug- 
ges ted ,  t h a t  t h e  expanding c u l t i v a t i o n  of American p l a n t s  such a s  the  po ta to  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improved l i f e  expectancy, and thus con t r ibu ted  t o  n a t u r a l  in- 
c rease  without  any necessary  rise i n  f e r t i l i t y .  Yet t h e  g e n e r a l  hypothesis  
t h a t  people ad jus ted  marriage and f e r t i l i t y  t o  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a d u l t  
p l aces  i n  c r a f t s  and on t h e  land i s  not  absurd. I n  one form o r  ano the r ,  
i t  has been around s i n c e  Malthus. And i t  i s  compatible wi th  many forms of 
- f e r t i l i t y  c o n t r o l  s h o r t  of t h e  self-conscious e f f i c a c y  of twentieth-century 
cont racept ion .  
P r o l e t a r i a n s  faced a  d i f f e r e n t  s e t  of circumstances. To t h e  ex ten t  
t h a t  t h e  world around them was p r o l e t a r i a n ,  they had both t h e  i n c e n t i v e  and 
the opportunity to marry and form their own households early. They could 
acquire the means of survival as adults at quite a young.age. The charac- 
teristic organization of work and the characteristic lifetime curve of earn- 
ings provided further encouragements to marriage and fertility. Especially 
in the many variants of domestic industry, the standard labor unit was 
not a single individual but a household -- for example, a weaver plus 
several spinners and tenders (see Tilly and Scott 1977). To work in these 
arrangments, it was almost essential to form a household. The fact that 
children began bringing in income at'an early age and the further fact that 
income peaked early in life and then declined with enfeebling age increased 
the incentives to high fertility. So long as employment opportunties, how- 
ever marginal, were expanding, a proletarian strategy of early marriage and 
, .  $ high fertility made sense. At least it made sense in the short run. 
Net Migration 
Migration figured in the formation of the Europeanproletariat in two 
t, 
rather different ways: as a crude component of growth, and as a process af- 
fecting reclassification and natural increase. From the perspective of 
Europe as a whole from 1500 to 1900, the chief contribution of migration 
was negative: the continent shipped out many more migrants than it took in, 
and the bulk of the out-migrants were proletarian. Before 1750 the net out- 
flows were small: colonists to the Americas, Slavs into continental Asia, 
trickles of settlers into other parts.of the world. With the accelerating 
population growth of the later eighteenth century, out-migration speeded 
up as well. A plausible estimate for the period from 1800 to World War I 
is a net loss of 50 million Europeans to extracontinental migration. Be- 
fore 1900, those out-migrants came disproportionately from the British Isles. 
From 1846 to 1890, for example, an estimated 48% of all Europeanout-migrants 
came from England, Scotland, Wales or Ireland (~osfnski 1970: 57). The 
loss of migrants was equivalent to a fifth or a sixth of the continent's 
entire nineteenth-century population growth. 
Most of those millions were proletarians. A prototype of the trans- 
atlantic migration was the outflow from seventeenth-century Tourouvre-au- 
Perche (Charbonneau 1970). The roughly 300 migrants from Tourouvre and 
vicinity and their numerous descendants played a major part in the settle- 
ment of Quebec. Labor recruiters intervened into a local but very active 
system of migration, in which wage-laborers already predominated. The 
recruiters drewa high proportion of young men in theit twenties, most 
of them apparently servants and day-laborers. In Canada, to be sure, 
their grants of land transferred them out of the proletariat. In the 
European reckoning, they were simply a loss of a few hundred proletarians. 
L 1, Or. take one.of,the best-documented flows after 1800: from Denmark 
. .- . - to America (Hvidt 1975). Denmark's nineteenth-century population ran 
. , ,. . . in the vicinity of two million people. That small country sent almost 
. .  . 300 thousand migrants to North America between 1840 and 1914. The bulk 
of the migrants were servants, wage-laborers and othe proletarians. The 
ideal candidates for emigration seem to have been young people who had 
already made the move from farms and villages to a nearby, slow-moving 
!J 
regional center. Many -- probably the great majority -- moved within 
chains of friends, neighbors and kinsmen who kept information about 
American opportunities flowing back to Denmark, and who helped the migrants 
find the passage money, j.obs and housing. The chains also made it easier 
for those who disliked America to return home. But their main effect 
was to facilitate the flow of emigrants from Denmark. ~heir'demographic 
effect was a net loss of some 200 thousand Danish proletarians. 
Migration also influenced the, growth of the proletariat indirectly 
through its effect on reclassification and natural increase. One of the 
most valuable by-products of recent European historical demography has 
been the accumulating evidence of high mobility levels before the period 
of large-scale industrialization. Contrary to the idea of an immobile 
pre-industrial world, historians of many different parts of Europe turn 
up village after village with annual migration rates of 10% or more 
(e.g. Bukatzsch 1951, Cornwall 1967, Gaunt 1976, Hammer 1976, Hollingsworth 
1971, Patten 1973, Poussou 1974, Sabean 1971). Americans of the last 
century have considered themselves exceptionally mobile because in the 
average year about 20% of the population have changed residence -- and 
, a great mariy of them have moved within the same community. Comparable. 
levels of mobility are showing up in many parts of Europe before massive 
industrialization. 
That high pre-industrial mobility, however, requires several qualifi- 
cations. First, that earlier Europe was not pre-industrial in a strict 
sense of the term. Dispersed, small-scale manufacturing played an import- 
ant part in rural and small-town life, occupying a significant part of the 
population at least part-time. People working in small-scale industry 
were a relatively mobile segment of the population. They also comprised 
a significant part of theEurop-eanproletariat .  Second, most of the moves 
were quite local. They consisted largely of exchanges of labor among 
nearby villages and of a small city's making up its natural decrease 
through the recruitment of youngsters from its immediate hinterland. 
Third, the most active migrants were proletarians. Proletarianization it- 
self produced migration, as when a household displaced by enclosures left 
the land or an extra child of a peasant family trudged off to work as a 
mercenary soldier or domestic servant. In addition, the proletarian. 
worker had the least to tie him to any particular locality, and the 
greatest incentive to follow the trail of better wages into a new labor 
market. The local authorities of seventeenth-century England considered 
the ever-present wanderers as potential workers in good times and as 
11 vagrants" in bad times (Slack 1974). In good times or bad they were 
quintessential proletarians. 
The pattern of proletarian mobility affected the performance of re- 
classification and natural increase as components of' the growth of the 
proletariat. The existence of well-established flows of migrants probably 
facilitated the proletarianization of the population in two ways. First, 
it helped produce a whole series of intermediate positions between the 
full artisan or peasant and the full proletarian -- the Alpine peasant 
who walked.off to be p.eddler in the winter, the weaver who-followed the . 
harvest in.the fall, and so'on.. What appeared to be temporary expedients 
imperceptibly became a proletarian life. Second, the existence of well- 
established migratory flows withdrew the proletarianizing populations from 
the communities in which they had rights and solidarity, and placed them 
in communities in which they had neither. If the choice had been sharper 
and more dramatic in either regard, one might suppose that the proletar- 
ians would have resisted their fate with greater determination and effec- 
tiveness. When the choice was sharp and the proletarianizing populations 
still embedded in their communities, they did often fight back. They 
fought by attacking others who were seizing control of the means of pro- 
duction, and they fought by adopting family strategies which limited the 
strain on household resources: strategies of late marriage, low fertility, 
regrouped inheritance, and so on. That fight against proletarianization 
pervades eighteenth-century peasant struggles . . against enclosures and 
alienation of common rights, nineteenth-century artisanal struggles 
against work-discipline, twentieth-century winegrowers' struggle against 
big producers. It was a losing battle, but .passionately fought. 
Caveats and Conclusions 
In hacking out the contours of this massive problem, I have neglected 
all the graceful refinements which make the problem interesting. For 
example, the detailed timetable of proletarianization matters a good 
deal. Surely the absolute number of peasants, artisans, and other non- 
proletarians increased substantially in the centuries after 1500; is it 
possible that at first they increased more rapidly than the population 
as a whole, and in that sense the sixteenth century was a time of - de-
proletarianization? The geography of proletarianization likewise cries 
out for attention. At a minimum we need contrasts among the legal enserf- 
ment of essentially landless laborers on the large estates of eastern 
Europe, the creation of a legally free proletarian labor force in England, 
and the emergence of landowning peasants and cash-crop farmers in import- 
ant parts of western Europe. Finally, a historically useful portrayal 
of the demography of proletarianization cannot stop with the tabulation 
of reclassification, natural increase and net migration as separate 
components. .It must specify their interplay. All this requires a more 
refined and sophisticated analysis than I have provided here. 
Back at the beginning of this long discussion I said there were 
three steps to the appropriate sociological procedure: the delineation 
of the components of growth, the separateexplanationof each of the com- 
ponents, and the int.egration of those explanations into'a comprehensive 
account of the whole process, We have not, by any means, completed that 
entire program. Yet the fragmentary observations we have made point to 
the utility of a modified Marxian account of Europeanproletarianization. 
The most important modification consists of the large significance at- 
tributed to natural increase within the existing proletariat. Marx 
implicitly made lifetime entries of non-proletarians -- that is, re- 
classification -- the major component of the proletariat's increase. 
The modification fits nicely with that brand of Marxian analysis, typi- 
fied by E.P. Thompson, which emphasizes the continuity of working-class 
culture from one generation to the next. 
Now, that is a gratifying conclusion for a reason we have not dis- 
cussed at all. It tells us we need not make some drastic choice between 
1 q  quantitative" and "qualitative" analyses, between numbers and people, 
between demagraphic characteristics and cultural characteristics, between 
sociology and history. In the particular context we have been exploring, 
the available sociology has the advantage of helping specify what is to 
be explained, and of helping sort out the available explanations. But 
it leads right back to honest history, history rooted in real times and 
places. 
Despite my initial disclaimers, I seem to have unfurled a banner. 
A red flag, you might say. The idea of Karl Marx as the master historical 
demographer containssomet;h~~ngto offend historians of almost every 
theoretical persuasion. That includes Marxists. Yet I have not woven 
the flag of whole cloth. On the contrary: it is athingof gaps and patches. 
The available sociology traces a broad pattern across the banner's riotous 
fragments. It is up to historians whoknow the real people, places and 
.processes involved to reweave the material into a coherent and valid 
design. 
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